This work was supported by the European Union Marie Curie Initial Training Network

Marie Curie Actions: FP7-PEOPLE-2013-ITN-604764

Associated URL: http://cognovo.eu

A neuropsycholinguistic chronometric embodied

cognition investigation of the vertical representation of

affect in visuo-spatial target detection

Christopher B. Germann (Ph.D., M.Sc., B.Sc. / Marie Curie Alumnus)

Abstract

In two psychophysical experiments we investigated if experimentally induced affective states

(positive vs. negative mood induced by film-clips) bias subsequent performance in a

computerised visual singleton target detection task. Neuropsycholinguistic research indicates

that affective conceptual metaphors consistently associate positive affect with elevated vertical

spatial positions and negative affect with depressed spatial positions. According to the generic

neuronal theory of thought and language, these semantic percept-concept association are

neurocomputationally encoded in Gestalt circuits according to Hebbian principles of long-term

potentiation/depression (LTP/LTD) and spike-timing depended plasticity (STDP), inter alia.

Based on this theoretical background we predicted a priori that positive experimental mood

induction facilitates reaction times (RTs) for target detection in the superior visual field (VF

)

relative to the orthogonal inferior visual field (VF

). Vice versa, we expected that negative mood

induction facilitates target detection RTs in VF

relative to VF

(Experiment 1 and 2). In

addition, Experiment 1 explicitly tested the prediction that affective states bias perceptual

judgments on the horizontal axis. Ex hypothesi, we predicted that positive mood induction

facilitates target detection RTs in the right temporal visual field (VF

) compared to the

contralateral left field (VF

). Per contrast, we predicted the inverse effect for target detection

RTs in VF

versus VF

. Impetus for the last hypothesis was derived from the

neuropsychological valence model of hemispheric processing of emotion perception which

postulates asymmetric neuronal lateralisation for specific classes of emotions. The data did not

corroborate our directional predictions. All a priori formulated hypotheses were falsified in a

The reported experiments were conducted at the Free University of Amsterdam.

Correspondence:

E-Mail: mail@cognovo.christopher-germann.eu

Personal URL: http://cognovo.christopher-germann.eu

Raw data + analysis syntax: http://cognovo.data-sup2.christopher-germann.eu/index.zip

quasi-Popperian sense (in support of the urgently needed open-science revolution we provide a

URL to the raw data for the purpose of statistical cross-validation and/or analytical reviews).

Implications of the findings are discussed in the generic theoretical framework of embodied

cognition and we will expound the crucial importance of negative results in a meta-analytic

context (e.g., big-data AI machine learning / publication & confirmation bias). Furthermore,

the de facto irrational epistemological basis of current publishing praxis is criticised from a

universal philosophy of science vantage point. We will close with a critical embodied cognition

discussion of the detrimental effects of constant screen exposure (e.g., ocular fixation on

*smart*phones) on the development of the neuroplastic sensorimotor architecture of children.

Keywords: Embodied cognition, Psychophysics, Affective conceptual metaphors, Spatial

perceptual bias, Dual-process theory, Hemispheric lateralisation, Mood manipulation,

Publication bias, Sensorimotor development.

“The words of language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my

mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought

are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be “voluntarily” reproduced and

combined. […] The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some of

muscular type.”

~ Albert Einstein

Introduction

The prefatory quotation by Albert Einstein illustrates the involvement of non-linguistic somatic

(physiological) and symbolic/visuo-spatial processes in higher-order abstract thought. The

fundamental question how human beings think about abstract concepts (viz., things they cannot

see, hear, touch, smell, or taste) is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy and hence in the

history of science. The ability to think and communicate about abstract non-tangible domains

such as mathematics, emotions, morality, et cetera, is presumably uniquely human and one of

the hallmarks of human sophistication. Up to date the question how human creatures represent

these abstract meta-physical

domains cognitively has not been satisfactorily answered. Earlier

classical cognitive models are based on the dualistic

Cartesian assumption of the ontological

disembodiment of mind (or soul,

in René Descartes terms; i.e., res extensa versus res

cogitans).

As quoted in Hadamard, 1996, The mathematician's mind: The psychology of invention in the mathematical

field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Meta-physical is used in the literal sense, i.e., “above physics”. Abstract thoughts do not directly correspond to

physical entities (even though they to use physical experience as a bases, as we shall discuss in greater detail).

Baruch de Spinoza formulated a non-dual ontological theory which postulates that mind and body are in

essence two aspect of the same thing (i.c., substance). This is the doctrine of dual-aspect monism which is

compatible with Advaita Vedānta (literally, "not-two", where the prefix “A” is the negation) a philosophical

school of thought which is influential in ancient Indian philosophy (what Aldous Huxley referred to as the

“perennial philosophy”). The negatory approach is based on the principle of “neti neti” transl.: "neither this, nor

that" – an epistemological principle which is reminiscent of Popperian falsification, i.e., the hypothetico-

deductive method which is dominant in contemporary science).

From a philological vantage point, the word psyche is etymologically derived from the ancient Greek ψυχή

(psukhḗ, “mind, soul, spirit, breath”). According to this definition psychology can thus be regarded as the study

(cf. logos) of the soul. However, today most psychologists are either nescience of this definition or

antagonistically opposed towards it (especially in the contemporary materialistic Zeitgeist, cf. the persistent

influence of Skinnerian behaviourisms and the reductive materialism which dominates much of cognitive

neuroscience). A large proportion of materialistic academic mainstream psychology thereby neglects its

extremely rich intellectual heritage which has deep historical roots in philosophy and which spans many cultures

and epochs (cf. the Vedantic Indian concept “Ātman” (Sanskrit for soul, breath, i.a.) which form the root of the

German word “Atmen” which translates into the English “breath/breathing”)). Psychology is thus the study of

the lifeforce – the soul – which intimately linked to the breath. It is not a mechanical subject as fields like

computational neuroscience other purely quantitative approaches often suggests even though much of

contemporary terminology is based on the computer metaphor (e.g., the central executive, short-term memory,

dual-process models, etc. pp.) in the same way as much of Freudian theorising was based on thermodynamics.

When thought is reintegrated in the bodily matrix (embodied cognition) a very different

perspective on human thinking emerges, namely, that we are not simply inhabitants of our body

— we literally utilise it to think through it. The “mind-body” problem is a longstanding problem

in the philosophy of mind and the “explanatory gap” is perhaps the most important open

problem contemporary neuroscience. It refers to the following fundamental question: How does

electro-chemical signal transduction in the human brain give rise to thought? In other words,

how do quantitative physical processes (i.e., at the neuronal level or at the subcellular

microtubular level) produce qualitative experiences (e.g., the phenomenological experience of

seeing the colour red). Hitherto, neuroscience and psychology cannot even begin to address this

question in a meaningful way.

This quintessential question is closely related to the hard

problem of consciousness.

Hence, the embodied cognition approach has deep philosophical implications. Moreover, it is

not merely of theoretical significance, but it has far-reaching ramifications for computer science

and specifically artificial intelligence and robotics research (e.g., machine learning algorithms

and situated self-learning automata). The broad field of embodied cognitive science is based on

the insight that cognition cannot be understood in vitro. The nucleus of this theoretical

framework is the major premise that cognitive activity is not an isolated phenomenon but that

it is a massively distributed system which spans across the agents physical, social, and cultural

environment. Embodiment and embeddedness are thus crucial factors for contemporary AI

research. It is virtually impossible to formulate a biologically plausible and empirically

adequate theory of intelligent behaviour without reference to (cognitive/neuronal)

representations. A given system is interactively situated in a specific environment which places

characteristic demands on its development (a cybernetic feedback-loop). Organism-

environment interactions are thus essential for the emergence of abstract representations (this

notion is incompatible with the influential Foderian “language of thought hypothesis” (LOT)

which stipulates that thought possess a combinatorial syntactical compositional structure

(mentalese) consisting of linguistic tokens, viz., symbol systems which are used for mental

computations, i.e., the computational theory of mind. Somewhat similar to Chomsky’s anti-

Skinnerian “universal grammar”, the LOT approach rests on a rationalist model of cognition

Perhaps the prima facie assumption that mind and matter are ontological different substances is fallacious.

There are alternative non-dual approaches, but these are quite unpopular in contemporary materialistic science

which assumes that physical matter is primary, and that mind is an emergent property of the former. However,

there is no logical a priori reason for this assumption (it is not supported by empirical evidence) and the inverse

relation is likewise plausible. In fact, cutting-edge evidence from experimental quantum physics points in this

direction (cf. recent refutations of naïve and local realism in the context of violations of Bell-inequalities).

and assumes that core aspects of human cognition (specific cognitive modules) are genetically

inherited/innate (i.e., psychological nativism) .

Ergo, the LOT approach stands in sharp contrast with embodied/grounded cognition approaches

(the enduring nature versus nurture debate). From a developmental embodied cognition point

of view, neuronal sensory and motor representations that develop from physical interactions

with the external world (in casu, vertical dimensions) are recycled to assist our thinking about

abstract phenomena. Impetus for this well-developed hypothesis is partially derived from

patterns observed in colloquial language. In order to communicate about abstract concepts,

people regularly utilize metaphors from concrete perceptual domains. As a simple example,

people experiencing {positive} affect are said to be feeling {up} whereas people experiencing

{negative} affect are said to be feeling {down}, viz., affective metaphors are represented in

spatial terms. Cognitive linguists who study cognitive semantics/semiotics (e.g., Gibbs, 1992;

Glucksberg, 2001) have argued that such articulations reveal that people psycholinguistically

conceptualize abstract concepts like affect metaphorically, in terms of physical reality (i.c.,

verticality). It has been argued that without such associative bindings abstract concepts would

lack common ground (e.g., semantic grounding)

and it would be difficult (if not impossible)

to convey abstract ideas to other people (Meier & Robinson, 2004). This psycholinguistic

approach enabled interdisciplinary scholars to make important interdisciplinary connections

between embodied experience, neuroanatomy, abstract concepts, and conceptual metaphors.

Embodied Cognition, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and Hebbian Neuroplasticity

Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) defines two basic roles for conceptual

domains posited in conceptual metaphors: 1) the source domain (the conceptual domain from

which metaphorical expressions are drawn) and 2) the target domain (the conceptual domain to

be understood). Conceptual metaphors usually refer to an abstract concept as target and make

use of concrete physical entities as their source. For example, morality is an abstract concept

and when people discuss morality, they recruit metaphors that tap into vertical space (a concrete

physical concept). In colloquial language a person who is moral is often described as ‘‘high

minded’’, whereas an immoral person might be denominated as ‘‘down and dirty’’ (Lakoff &

Johnson, 1999). Following theory the human tendency for categorization is structured by

Cf. Ludwig van Wittgenstein’s “language games”, for instance, the “Beetle in a box” Gedankenexperiment

(also known as “the private language argument”; cf. §243 in Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”

published in 1953).

imagistic, metaphoric, and schematizing abilities that are themselves embedded in the neuro-

biological motor and perceptual infrastructure (Jackson, 1983). Supporters of this view suggest

that cognition, rather than being amodal, is by nature linked to sensation and perception and

consequently inherently cross-modal (e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman & Krauth-

Gruber, 2005). Furthermore, those researchers argue for the bodily basis of thought and its

continuity beyond the infantile sensorimotor stage (e.g., Seitz, 2000). Cellular Hebbian

mechanism of synaptic strength modulation (long-term potentiation and depression; LTP/LTD)

have been suggested as neuronal-mechanical physiological substrates for conceptual

metaphors. These changes involve processes at the presynaptic level (e.g., direct modulation of

the neurotransmitter release mechanisms and the reuptake machinery) and postsynaptic

processes (modulation of receptor properties, e.g., receptor density and receptor morphology),

inter alia.

Developmental neuro/synapto-plasticity thus likely plays a crucial role in this

context (i.e., theories of synaptic sprouting & pruning). Indeed, a large corpus of research

suggest that the neurological processes that make abstract thought possible are intimately

connected with the neurological processes that are responsible for representing perceptual

experiences (we call this the “neuronal perception-cognition continuum”; in other words, a

neuroanatomical coupling of perceptual and higher cognitive functions). In line with this

argument, it appears that the motor system (i.e., hierarchically organised topographic maps in

the parietal cortex which represent the sensory organs) plays a central neuroanatomical rôle in

higher-order abstract metaphorical thinking (the mirror-neuron system and the mental

simulation of behavioural actions are crucial components in this context). This correlation is

assumed to be unidirectional. Specifically, it is argued that conceptual thought is based on

sensory experience, but sensory experience is not based on conceptual thought (e.g., love is a

rose, but a rose is a rose; Meier & Robinson, 2005).

Interestingly, a similar explanatory framework forms the basis contemporary dual-process

theories of cognition. For instance, Kahneman (2003) argues that higher-order cognitive

A rapidly growing body of research indicates that non-synaptic cellular plasticity mechanisms accompany

synaptic changes (presumably concomitantly), for instance, modulations of neuronal excitability (viz., alterations

of voltage-dependent membrane conductance via voltage-gated channels). The functional significance of these

processes remains largely elusive, but they might play an important role in Hebbian learning. Further, it is

important to emphasise that science has no theory how mental contest (ideas) “emerge” from physical properties

(neurons) – this is the perennial “explanatory gap” in neuroscience and philosophy of mind.

According to theory, this unidirectional correlation I based on time-dependent plasticity at the level of neuronal

pairing (first the perceptual source domain is activated and then the abstract target domain). That is, first neuron

A which is responsible for perception is activated which is then followed by neuronal firing in neuron B

(spreading activation is unidirectional; viz., paired stimulation for spike-timing-dependent plasticity always

follows the direction A => B).

processes are conditioned on the principles of lower-level perceptual processes. He advocates

an evolutionary perspective on abstract reasoning and his reflections are based on the

assumption that there is a kind of quasi biogenetic progression in the evolution of cognitive

processes, starting from automatic perceptual processes which form the fundamental basis for

the evolution of more deliberate and abstract modes of information processing. The postulated

phylogenetic history of cognitive processes can be adumbrated as follows:

PERCEPTION => INTUITION => REASONING

According to this sequential view on the Darwinian evolution of cognitive systems, perception

appears early on the timeline of history (and ergo present in many species), whereas abstract

higher-order reasoning evolved relatively recently (a hallmark of human cognition). Intuition

is intermediate between the automatic (System 1) processes of perception and the deliberate,

higher-order reasoning (System 2) processes that are the hallmark of human intelligence

(Kahneman, 2003).

This line of reasoning connects neatly with the embodied cognition framework expounded

above. The impetus behind the present research is thus essentially based on the following

question: Why is an abstract concept like affect so frequently linked to concrete perceptual

qualities like vertical position? And what are the specific neuro-cognitive mechanisms which

undergird this association?

One possible explanation for this “perceptual-conceptual” connection comes from classical

developmental research. Early theorists of sensorimotor learning and development emphasized

the importance of movement in cognitive development (e.g., Piaget, 1952). According to this

perspective, human cognition develops through sensorimotor experiences. Young children in

the Piagetian sensorimotor stage (from birth to about age two) think and reason about things

that they can see, hear, touch, smell or taste. Motor skills emerge and the infant cultivates the

coordination of tactile and visual information. Later developmental researchers postulated that

thinking is an extended form of these more fundamental behaviours and that it is based on these

earlier modes of adaptation to the physical environment (Bartlett, 1958). For example, it has

been suggested that gesture and speech form parallel systems (McNeill, 1992) and that the body

is central to mathematical comprehension (Lakoff & Nunez, 1997).

Thus, when children grow older, they develop the skills to think in abstract terms and these

higher skills are built upon more primitive earlier sensorimotor representations. For example, a

warm bath leads to a pleasant sensory experience and positive affect (thalamic/limbic

processes). In adulthood, this pairing of sensory and abstract representations may give rise to a

physical metaphor (e.g., a warm person is a pleasant person) that continues to exert effects on

representation and evaluation (Meier & Robinson, 2004).

Transferred to the vertical

representation of affect one can currently only speculate. Tolaas (1991) proposes that infants

spend much of their time lying on their back. Rewarding sensory stimuli like food and affection

arrive from a high vertical position. The caregiver frequently appears in the infant’s upper

visual-spatial environment (Meier, Sellbom & Wygant, 2007). Given that neuroplasticity is still

very high in the developing brain, specific associative neuronal pathways are formed by

repetition (via LTP/LTD/STDP). As children age, they use (recycle) this sensorimotor

foundation to develop abstract thought, as recognized by developmental psychologists (e.g.,

Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). This early conditioning causes adults to use the vertical dimension

when expressing and representing affect. These considerations suggest that the link between

affect and vertical position may develop early in the sensorimotor stage (see Gibbs, 2006; for

sophisticated considerations) due to specific neuroplastic adaptations in brains circuitry

which

are primarily based on experience (e.g., sensory input). What follows are some paradigmatic

exemplars of primary metaphors in the spatial domain (orientational metaphors) which couple

the prelinguistic perceptual source domain with the abstract conceptual target domain:

Up => More

Down => Less

Up => Happy

Down => Sad

Up =>Moral

Down => Immoral

N.B. These association can vary across cultures (i.e., language-specific conceptualisations are

at variance in different linguistic milieus).

Another example would be the involvement of the insular cortex in disgust – be it “olfactory disgust”,

“gustatory disgust” or “moral disgust”.

In addition to neuroplastic changes, synaptic pruning plays a formative role in the formation of experience-

specific neurocircuitry. Especially during approximately the first five years of development structural and

functional brain networks “crystallise”. This system-level rewiring constantly defines the connectivity of the

developing brain in an experience-dependent manner and it is assumed that a large amount of neurons is pruned

during these developmental stages (but see Ablitz, et al., 2007).

The classical “Aristotelian Peripatetic Axiom” is of pertinence in this context. This

epistemological argument highlights the importance of sensory input in the context of reasoning

and knowledge:

Nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu.

Translation from the Latin: Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.

According to this empirical stance, the human mind is furnished by sensory impressions which

in turn form the basis of ideas. In other words, the data which impinges on our sensorium

“determines” our thoughts (and, in sensu lato, our Weltanschauung/worldview).

John Locke used a similar line of reasoning in his classic text “An Essay Concerning Human

Understanding” (1690), specifically his chapter “On the Association of Ideas”.

According to Locke, empirical (sensory) data which is accumulated diachronically (during the

course of a lifetime) forms the basis of thought. Locke argues that the most elementary act is

the sensory act and the most elementary contents of the mind are sensations. He remarks: “For

to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly

intelligible” (op. cit., Chapter II - On Innate Ideas). In other words, what enters the mind comes

through the sensorium and these elementary sensations are then connected. According to

Newton, the corpuscular components of reality are held together by gravitational forces, i.e.,

per analogiam with Newton's law of universal gravitation which follows the inverse-square

law.

Locke ingeniously transferred the Newtonian idea of physical gravitation to elementary

sensations and proposes the principle of mental association as the psychological counterpart.

Events which are experienced together frequently are connected by associative processes.

The full text of this timeless classic is available under the following URL:

https://archive.org/details/essay_concerning_human_understanding2_1904_librivox/humanunderstanding

The inverse-square law can be mathematically notated as follows: gravitational intensity ∝

distance

In the context of Locke’s psychological theory, the term “gravitational intensity” can be replaced with

“associational intensity”. While gravitation is the attraction of two physical objects, association describes the

attraction between mental concepts (i.e., ideas). For instance, the “distance” between various concepts can be

indirectly quantified by variations in reaction-times in a semantic priming paradigm, for instance, the implicit-

association test (IAT) (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Sriram & Greenwald, 2009). The concepts “tree” and “roots”

are closer associated (i.e., the “associational intensity” is stronger) than the concepts “university” and “beer”

(perhaps this is an unfortunate example, but it illustrates the general point). Locke thus combined physics with

psychology and he could thus perhaps be regard as one of the first psychophysicist (long before Fechner).

Interestingly, it has been noted by historians of philosophy and science that “Locke's attitude towards the

nature of ideas in the Essay is reminiscent of Boyle's diffident attitude towards the nature of matter” (Allen,

2010, p. 236).

This Lockean idea can be regarded as the predecessor of Hebbian engrams and assembly theory – “cells that

fire together wire together” (Hebb, 1949).

These then recombine to form simple ideas. Out of simple ideas, increasingly complex ideas

are hierarchically assembled by the binding force of association – this the Lockean associative

“logic of ideas”. The Lockean associationist memetic

account is de facto of great pertinence

today (e.g., machine learning algorithms, associative (Bayesian) neural networks in artificial

intelligence, “deep” multi-layered convolutional networks, etc.). Locke was clearly far ahead

of his time.

In the context at hand, Lockean associationism can be regarded as the predecessor of Hebbian

engrams and cell assembly theory – which function according to the Hebbian mantra “cells

that fire together wire together” (Hebb, 1949). There is general consensus among embodied

cognition researchers that Hebbian principles form the neuronal basis of conceptual metaphors

(but see Lakoff, 2014). The ancient empiricist axiom of how the mind is furnished through the

sensorium has thus been corroborated by fundamental research in 20

century neuroscience

and cybernetics. According to Hebbian theory connected cells combine into engrams. Multiple

cells, in turn, become cell assemblies (cf. Locke’s description above). Hebb stated the following

to describe his approach:

“The general idea is an old one, that any two cells or systems of cells that are repeatedly active

at the same time will tend to become ‘associated’ so that activity in one facilitates activity in

the other.” (Hebb, 1949, p.70)

Hebb wrote further:

“When one cell repeatedly assists in firing another, the axon of the first cell develops synaptic

knobs (or enlarges them if they already exist) in contact with the soma of the second cell.” (op.

cit. p.63)

A conscience mathematical formulaic description of Hebb's postulate is provided by the

following formula:







�



=1













where w

is the weight of the connection from neuron j to neuron i, p is the number of training

patterns, and x

the k

input for neuron i.

The science of memetics tries to (mathematically) understand the evolution of memes, analogous to the way

genetics aims to understand the evolution of genes (Kendal & Laland, 2000). Locke’s early contributions are

pivotal for the development of this discipline which is embedded in the general framework of complex systems

theory (Heylighen & Chielens, 2008). Memetics is of great importance for our understanding of creativity and

the longitudinal evolution of ideas in general. Memes reproduce, recombine, mutate, compete and only the best

adapted survive in a given fitness landscape. Similar to genotypes, the degree of similarity/diversity between

memes (and their associated fitness values) determines the topology of the fitness landscape.

Thus, repetition of specific information patterns consolidates specific information processing

pathways in the brain (per analogiam to a path in a forest which becomes more defined and

more widely used the more people walk people walk on it, similarly, the ocean washes specific

grooves into cliffs over elongated periods of time). Accordingly, the Weltanschauung

(worldview) of human beings is shaped by the information we are exposed to. The crux of this

line of reasoning is that the brain learns by repetition and that sensory information shapes our

brain and hence our mental models of reality. It can thus be agued that conceptual metaphors

are based on the same Aristotelian/Lockeian/Hebbian principle of association between

sensation and thought. It is the pairing of sensory inputs which creates the associations (i.e.,

neuro-computational coupling / quasi “gravitational” binding) between the source domain and

the target domain of conceptual metaphors. These circuits are not restricted to specific

modalities (amodal circuitry) and based on pathways that cascade across sensory maps to create

neuronal bindings (Gestalts circuits) which form the basis of conceptual metaphors which

structure language and thought.

From theory to praxis: Experimental applications of conceptual metaphor theory

Affective metaphor theory has recently gained a lot of attention in the domain of political

decision-making (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Lin & Chiang, 2015; Miller, 2006; Musolff,

2004). Such unconscious association can for instance be utilised for the purpose of impression-

management as “persuasive devices” (Mio, 1997), particularly in the context of public relations

à la Bernays (cf. Schölzel, 2014). Affective metaphors and related metaphoric associations

apply to a multitude of perceptual dimensions such as, for example, spatial location, brightness

and tone pitch. A plethora of studies investigated the link between abstract concepts (i.c., affect)

and physical representation (i.c., verticality). For example, in a study conducted by Meier and

Robinson (2004) participants had to evaluate positive and negative words either above or below

a central cue. Evaluations of negative words were faster when words were in the down rather

than the up position, whereas evaluations of positive words were faster when words were in the

up rather than the down position. In a second study, using a sequential priming paradigm, they

showed that evaluations activate spatial attention. Positive word evaluations reduced reaction

times for stimuli presented in higher areas of visual space, whereas negative word evaluations

reduced reaction times for stimuli presented in lower areas of visual space. A third study

revealed that spatial positions do not activate evaluations (e.g., “down” does not activate

‘‘bad’’). Their studies give credit to the assumption that affect has a physical basis.

Moreover, a seminal study by Wapner, Werner, and Krus (1957) examined the effects of

success and failure on verticality related judgements. They found that positive mood states,

compared to negative mood states, were associated with line bisections that were higher within

vertical space.

In a more recent study Meier et al. (2007) reported that people have implicit associations

between God-Devil and up-down. Their experiments showed that people encode God-related

concepts faster if presented in a high (vs. low) vertical position. Moreover, they found that

people estimated strangers as more likely to believe in God when their images appeared in a

high versus low vertical position.

Another study by Meier and Robinson (2006) correlated individual differences in emotional

experience (neuroticism and depression) with reaction times with regard to high (vs. low)

spatial probes. The higher the neuroticism or depression of participants, the faster they

responded to lower (in contrast to higher) spatial probes. Their results indicate that negative

affect influences covert attention in a direction that favours lower regions of visual space. In

second experiment the researchers differentiated between neuroticism and depression. They

argued that neuroticism is more trait-like in nature than depression (which is more state-like).

The researchers concluded from their analysis that depressive symptoms were a stronger

predictor of metaphor consistent vertical selective attention than neuroticism.

Similar results emerged when dominance-submission was assessed as an individual difference

variable and a covert spatial attention tasks was used to assess biases in vertical selective

attention (Robinson, Zabelina, Ode & Moeller, in press). Linking higher levels of dominance

to higher levels of perceptual verticality they found that dominant individuals were faster to

respond to higher spatial stimuli, whereas submissive individuals were faster to respond to

lower spatial stimuli.

Further support for the Conceptual Metaphor Theory comes from a study investing the extent

to which verticality is used when encoding moral concepts (Meier, Sellbom & Wygant, 2007).

Using a modified IAT

the researchers showed that people use vertical dimensions when

processing moral-related concepts and that psychopathy moderates this effect.

Inspired by the observation that people often use metaphors that make use of vertical positions

when they communicate concepts like control and power (e.g. top manager vs. subordinate),

some researchers investigated social structure from a social embodiment perspective. For

example, Giessner and Schubert (2007) argued that thinking about power involves mental

simulation of vertical location. The researchers reported that the description of a powerful

leader led participants to place the picture of the leader in an organization chart significantly

higher as compared to the description of a non-powerful leader.

As mentioned above, affective metaphors and related associations apply multitudinous

perceptual dimensions. Recent research examined the association between stimulus brightness

and affect (Meier, Robinson & Clore, 2004). The investigators hypothecated that people

automatically infer that bright things are good, whereas dark things are bad (e.g., light of my

life, dark times). The researchers found that categorization was inhibited when there was a

mismatch between stimulus brightness (white vs. black font) and word valence (positive vs.

negative). Negative words were evaluated faster and more accurately when presented in a black

font, whereas positive words were evaluated faster and more accurately when presented in a

white font. In addition, their research revealed the obligatory nature of this connection.

Furthermore, a series of studies showed that positive word evaluations biased subsequent tone

judgment in the direction of high-pitch tones, whereas participants evaluated the same tone as

lower in pitch when they evaluated negative words before (Weger, Meier, Robinson & Inhoff,

2007).

In addition, recent experimental work supports the notion that experiences in a concrete domain

influence thought about time (an abstract concept). Researchers assume that, in the English

language, two prevailing spatial metaphors are used to sequence events in time (e.g., Lakoff &

Johnson, 1980). The first is the ego-moving metaphor, in which the observer progresses along

a timeline toward the future. The second is the time-moving metaphor, in which “a time-line is

conceived as a river or a conveyor belt on which events are moving from the future to the past”

(Boroditsky, 2000, p. 5). In an experimental study by Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002),

participants had to answer the plurivalent question: “Next Wednesdays meeting has been moved

forward two days. What day is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled?” Before asking

this ambiguous question participants were led to think about themselves or another object

moving through space. If participants were led to think about themselves as moving forward

(ego-moving perspective), then participants answered more often “Friday”. On the other hand,

if had thought of an object as moving toward themselves (time-moving perspective), then they

more often answered “Monday”. The researchers showed that those effects do not depend on

linguistic priming, per se. They asked the same ambivalent question to people in airports.

People who had just left their plane responded more often with Friday than people who were

waiting for someone.

Moreover, cognitive psychologists have shown that people employ association between

numbers and space. For example, a by study Dehaene, Dupoux and Mehler (1990) showed that

probe numbers smaller than a given reference number were responded to faster with the left

hand than with the right hand and vice versa. These results indicated spatial coding of numbers

on mental digit line. Dehaene, Bossini and Giraux (1993) termed the mentioned association of

numbers with spatial left-right response coordinates the SNARC-effect (Spatial-Numerical

Association of Response Codes). Another SNARC-effect related issue is that empirical data

indicates that associations between negative numbers with left space exist. For example, in a

study by Fischer, Warlop, Hill and Fias (2004) participants had to select the larger number

compared to a variable reference number of a pair of numbers ranging from –9 to 9. The results

showed that negative numbers were associated with left responses and positive numbers with

right responses. The mentioned results support the idea that spatial association give access to

the abstract representation of numbers. As mentioned above, master mathematicians like

Einstein explicitly accentuate the role of the concrete spatial representation of numbers for the

development of their mathematical ideas. Today there are a few savants which can do

calculation up to 100 decimal places. They also emphasize visuo-spatial imagery as in the case

of Daniel Tammet

who has an extraordinary form of synæsthesia which enables him to

visualize numbers in a landscape and to solve huge calculations in the head. Moreover, about

15% of ordinary adults report some form of visuo-spatial representation of numbers (Seron,

Pesenti, Noel, Deloche & Cornet, 1992). This implies that the integration of numbers into visuo-

spatial coordinates is not a rare phenomenon.

The mentioned studies show that abstract concepts (invisible and intangible) have an

astonishing physical basis and that many dimensions of the physical world help us to represent

those abstract domains. In addition to the hypothecated vertical representation of affect we

wanted to explore if positive mood facilitates target detection in the right visual field compared

to target detection in the left visual field and vice versa. Perhaps it is possible that there is a

connection between the SNARC effect and the horizontal perceptual bias we hypothecate. It

might be speculated that there is a connection between negative and small numbers which are

apparently associated with left responses and negative affective states (which could facilitate

target perception in the left visual field). In both cases the right (contra lateral) hemisphere is

engaged. For example, the valence model of hemispheric processing of emotion perception

assigns specific functions to each hemisphere. The following paragraph tries to shed some light

on the question how people perceive and process emotional stimuli from a neuropsychological

point of view.

The neuropsychological valence model of hemispheric processing of emotion

perception

The widely debated neuropsychological valence hypothesis assumes that the right hemisphere

is specialized for negative emotion and that the left hemisphere is specialized for positive

emotion (Ehrlichman, 1987; Silberman & Weingartner, 1986). Many studies and in particularly

those concerned with the perception of emotion report hemispheric differences as a function of

positive vs. negative emotions (e.g., Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito & Matsumura, 2004;

Van Strien & Luipen, 1999; Heller & Nitschke, 1997; Adolphs, Jansari & Tranel, 2001).

Patients who had an injury in the right hemisphere are more likely to have trouble perceiving

negative emotions in affective faces but the perception of posititive emotions is typically

preserved (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1996). Further support for the relative

trueness of the valence hypothesis comes from studies recording event-related potentials

(ERPs) reporting that emotional responses to aversive stimuli facilitated right hemisphere

processing during higher cognitive tasks (Simon-thomas, Role & Knight, 2005).

Countless amytal injection studies found that injection at the left carotid artery induced extreme

reactions, which were characterized by guilt, crying, pessimistic statements and worries about

the future (Rossi & Rosadini, 1967; Silberman & Weingartner, 1986). On the other hand,

injection at the right carotid artery caused an euphoric reaction that consisted of lack of

apprehension, laughing, smiling and a sense of well-being. The mood changes associated with

the injection of one hemisphere are thought to represent the release of one hemisphere from

contra lateral inhibitory influences (Silberman & Weingartner, 1986). These findings have been

supported by observations of patients suffering from brain damage in which individuals with

left-hemisphere lesions were more likely to show “catastrophic” behaviour, whereas patients

with right hemisphere lesions were more likely to show “indifferent” behaviour (Heilman et al.,

1975).

Early tachistoscopic studies provided supporting results for the valence hypothesis. For

example, Reuter-Lorenz, Givis and Moscovitch (1983) presented happy or sad facial

expressions in one visual field while simultaneously presenting a neutral expression in the other

visual field. Participants were instructed to identify the side that contained the emotional face.

Reaction times were shorter for happy faces shown within the right visual field relative to happy

faces shown within the left visual field. Moreover, sad faces shown within the left visual field

where processed faster compared to sad faces shown within the right visual field. Subsequent

studies also found that in some cases, negative affective faces are identified more rapidly or

more accurately when presented within the left visual field (e.g., Everhart & Harrison, 2000).

Perhaps the most persuasive results in support of the valence hypothesis were derived from a

vast number of EEG studies that have linked increased left hemisphere activity with positive

affect and increased right-hemisphere activity with negative affect. For example, Davidson et

al. (1979) instructed participants to indicate their emotional responses while watching a

television program with varying emotional content. EEG measurements displayed relative left-

hemisphere activity during a positive emotional response, whereas the opposite pattern was

observed during a negative emotional response. However, it should be noted that other EEG

researchers testing the valence hypothesis have sometimes reported the opposite pattern of

activation (e.g., Schellberg, Besthern, Pfleger & Gasser, 1993).

A more differentiated version of the valence hypothesis (Davidson, 1984) suggests that the

frontal regions of both hemispheres are involved in the experience and expression of emotions

whereas the posterior regions of the right hemisphere are involved in the perception of emotion.

Moreover, frontal regions of the left hemisphere are specialised for positive emotions and

frontal regions of the right hemisphere are specialised for negative emotions.

A priori predictions

In accord with the mentioned theories (conceptual metaphor theory, valence model of

hemispheric processing of emotion perception) we predicted that positive and negative mood

states cause systematic differences in visuo-spatial information processing. Functionalistic

perspectives on affect act on the assumption that affect has an informative value and that cues

from positive and negative emotions/mood may be experienced as information that promotes

attention to global and local information, respectively (Gasper & Clore, 2002). Our primary

hypothesis predicted that being in a positive or negative mood influences information

processing in a metaphorically consistent directional manner. We expected that participants in

a positive mood respond faster to targets presented to the superior visual field (relative to targets

presented to the inferior visual field) and that negative mood facilitates target detection in the

inferior visual field (relative to targets presented to the superior visual field). We investigated

this hypothesis in Experiment 1 and 2. Furthermore, our secondary hypothesis forecasted that

participants in a positive mood will show shorter reaction times with regard to targets presented

to the right visual field compared to targets presented to the left visual field, whereas

participants in a negative mood should show the opposite pattern. The last hypothesis is in line

with the valence model of hemispheric processing of emotion.

Experiment 1

We conducted Experiment 1 to determine if positive mood facilitates target detection in the

superior visual field relative to target detection in the inferior visual field. Consequently, we

were interested whether negative mood facilitates target detection in the inferior visual field

relative to target detection in the superior visual field. In addition, we aimed to examine if

positive mood facilitates target detection in the right visual field compared to target detection

in the left visual field, whereas negative mood facilitates target detection in the left visual field

compared to target detection in the right visual field.

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 48 students at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam which participated in this

study on a voluntary basis and were naïve to the purpose of the study. They either received

course credit or participated on a paid basis. The study employed a mixed design. The between-

participants independent variable was the mood induction procedure with two levels (positive

vs. negative mood induction) and the within-participants dependent variable was the reaction

time on four different target locations (up, down, left, right) in a visual search task.

Materials and procedure

Each participant was seated in a sound-attenuated, 2x2x2m cubicle (amplisilent). A high-

resolution color computer monitor (800x600 pixel screen-resolution, 24-bit truecolor color

depth, 59 Hertz refresh rate) was located at eye level. They were informed that all instructions

and tasks would be presented on screen.

Mood induction procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two different mood induction conditions

(positive vs. negative mood). They viewed a film clip, which lasted approximately 7min in both

conditions. The positive film clip was a scene from “Jungle Book,” and the negative clip was a

scene from the film “Sophie’s choice” (see Appendix for details). Meta-analytic research

indicates that film clips are an effective and reliable method to induce both positive and negative

mood (for a systematic comparison of various mood-induction procedures see Westermann,

Spies & Hesse, 1996).

Mood manipulation check

Directly after the mood induction participants were asked to indicate how they ‘feel at this

moment’ which they did on a modified four-item Visual Analog Scale (Aitken, 1969), ranging

from 0=not at all to 100=very much. The four items participants responded to were: I feel

positive; I feel negative; I feel happy; I feel sad. Participants were instructed to indicate their

mood by mouse clicking on a position of the Visual Analog Mood Scales (VAMS; consisting

of a single, horizontal white line on a black background) that best represented their affective

state. Furthermore, participants responded to a control item (I feel fraught) to ensure that they

understood the task. The four Visual Analog Mood Scales were presented in succession and in

a counterbalanced order. Prior research indicated that the VAMS is a brief, easily administered,

and valid measures of mood states (Stern, 1997). For example, the VAMS correlated

significantly with other, more extensive and verbally demanding mood measures like the POMS

Depression/Dejection scale and the Beck Depression Inventory.

Visual search task.

Subsequent to the mood manipulation check, participants completed the visual search task

which was presented on the same computer-monitor. Stimuli were presented using E-Prime

software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.; Pittsburgh, PA). A white fixation dot (0.15° of

diameter at an observation distance of ≈75cm) was displayed on a black background in the

centre of the computer screen throughout the experiment. Participants were instructed to focus

on the fixation dot and not to move the eyes during the course of any trial (steady ocular

fixation). It was emphasized that steady fixation would facilitate fast and accurate reactions

(i.e., speed-accuracy trade-offs). The search display consisted of four grey outline circles

(approximately 1.5° of diameter) on a black background. The midpoints of the outline circles

superposed the vertexes of an imaginary square diamond shape (6.84° x 6.84°) and the fixation

dot constituted the centre of this figure. When a target was present all the outline circles were

grey except for one, which constituted the target and was either red or green. Half of the trials

the target was present, whereas in the other half the target was absent. In target-present trials

the target position was randomized among the four possible element positions. Moreover, half

of the target-present trials consisted of a green target, whereas the other half consisted of a red

target. Participants were instructed to indicate as fast and accurate as possible whether the target

was present or absent and to press the appropriate response key with one of her/his index fingers

resting on the response keys. The response panel consisted of a standard ASCII keyboard and

the response keys were the “m” and “z” keys. Furthermore, the order of these keys was

counterbalanced so that half of the participants indicated “yes” with their right hand and the

other half indicated “yes” with their left hand. Each participant performed a practice block

consisting of 32 trials and after that a total of 5 experimental blocks, each with 32 trials (a total

of 160 experimental trials). Participants received feedback regarding their reaction time (in

milliseconds) and accuracy (in percentage) after each block and were asked to write down this

feedback on a spreadsheet which was laid out in front of them. If the mean accuracy of the

practice block was lower than 60% participants had to repeat the 32 practice trials.

The sequence of events was as follows: Initially, the white fixation dot was presented for

750ms, followed by the search display. The search display remained present for a maximum of

2sec until a response was emitted. In case no response was made after 2sec, the participants

were requested to “React faster!” (a salient message in red font appeared). In case of a false

response the participants were informed by the notification “Error!” (a message in red font).

Figure 1 shows the various display configurations in a trial sequence. Upon completion of the

visual search task, the participants were debriefed about the objective of the study. Finally,

participants were thanked for their time, remunerated and released.

Figure 1. An example of a trial sequence in the search task. The fixation dot was presented for

750ms, followed by the stimulus display. Percipients had two seconds to respond.

Results of Experiment 1

Validation of experimental mood manipulations

To examine the effectiveness of the mood induction procedure an independent-samples t-test

was conducted to compare self-reported mood between mood induction conditions. Participants

indicated their mood on a four item Visual Analog Mood Scale which was scored from 0 to

100, based on the distance in millimetres from the left pole. Two VAMS items which measured

negative affect (I feel negative; I feel sad) were reverse coded so that high ratings indicated

positive mood. The four VAMS items formed an internally consistent scale (Cronbach’s α =

.98), therefore we analysed the mean composite score of the four items (George & Mallery,

2003). The t-test was statistically significant, t(46) = 14.83, p < .05, η2 = .83, indicating that

participants in the negative mood induction condition (M = 25.42, SD = 15.54) on the average

reported less positive feelings than those in the positive mood-induction condition (M = 84.65,

SD = 11.88). The eta square index indicated that 83% of the variance of the dependent variable

(mean composite mood score) was accounted for by whether a participant was assigned to the

positive mood induction condition or the negative mood induction condition.

Statistical reaction time analysis

Only trials in which the target was present were included in the statistical analysis. Furthermore,

inaccurate trials were dropped from the analysis. The total percentage of errors in response to

the target was 5.57%. Reaction times were then log-transformed to reduce the skewness of the

distribution. Log transformation tends to normalize distributions and reduces the impact of long

response times in the tails of the distributions, therefore reducing the impact of long outliers,

leading to higher power for ANOVA (Ratcliff, 1993). Trials that were 2.5 standard deviations

below or above the grand mean were excluded from the analysis, as these likely reflect

erroneous responses or lapses of attention.

A 2 (mood induction condition: positive vs. negative) x 2 (target position: top vs. bottom)

repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the log-transformed reaction times.

The

between subjects’ factor was the mood induction condition and the within subject factor was

the target position. Neither of the main effects was significant: F(1, 46) = 2.94, p > .05, η2 =

.06, for the mood induction condition and F < 1, for the target position. Contrary to our a priori

predictions, the mood induction x target position interaction was also nonsignificant, F < 1. The

results are visualised in Figure 2.

Furthermore, a 2 (mood induction condition: positive vs. negative) x 2 (target position: left vs.

right) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. The main effects were nonsignificant: F(1,

46) = 3.58, p > .05, η2 = .06, for the mood induction condition and F < 1, for the target position.

Contrary to our prediction, the mood induction x target position interaction was also

nonsignificant, F < 1.

N.B.: We used “conventional” Type III sum of squares (SS) in all reported analyses. It should be noted that it

is strange that for regression (forward, backward, stepwise methods), the type of SS is always reported while

thuis information is usually neglected for ANOVA, despite the fact that it is based on the same linear model (but

see Howell, 2002).

Statistical error rate analysis

The total percentage of errors in response to the target was 5.57%. In addition, errors rates were

calculated for each condition for each participant. A repeated-measures ANOVA was

performed on these totals with target location (top vs. bottom) as the within subject factor and

mood induction condition as the between subject factor. The factor target location was not

significant, F < 1. There was no significant effect of mood induction condition, F(1, 46) = 2.50,

p > .05, and the interaction between target location and mood induction condition was also

nonsignificant, F(1, 46) = 3.78, p > .05. The results mimicked those found in the reaction time

data. Furthermore, a repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the target miss rates with

target location (left vs. right) as the within subject factor and mood induction condition as the

between subject factor. The factor target location was not significant, F < 1. There was no

significant effect of mood induction condition, F < 1, and the interaction between target location

and mood induction condition was also nonsignificant, F < 1. This pattern was also present in

the reaction time data.

Figure 2. Mean reaction time for target present trials as a function of mood induction condition.

Discussion of Experiment 1

The results of our analysis confirmed that the mood induction procedure was effective.

Participants in the positive mood induction condition on the average reported more positive

feelings than those in the negative mood induction condition. However, the ANOVA results of

the reaction time analysis did not support our hypotheses. Mood did not facilitate visual

attention in any direction (neither vertical nor horizontal). The error rate analysis was congruent

with the RT analysis.

Experiment 2

Experiment 2 was basically a reductive variation of Experiment 1. Given the nonsignificant

results of Experiment 1 we tried to eliminate potentially confounding factors and focused our

interest exclusively on the vertical representation of affect. We chose to conduct a visual

discrimination task to get a clearer picture of selective visual attention as a function of affect

(i.e., positive vs. negative mood). It is thinkable that the stimuli in Experiment 1 activated the

whole visual field because targets were presented to the upper, lower, left and right visual field.

It is plausible that this activation masked the hypothesised perceptual bias on the vertical

dimension. To address this potential confound methodologically we conducted a second

experiment where the target was located either at the top or the bottom of the stimulus display.

Method

Participants and design

Participants were 20 students at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and participated in this study

on a voluntary basis. They either received course credit or took part on a paid basis. The study

used a mixed design. As in Experiment 1, the between-participants independent variable was

the mood induction procedure with two levels (positive vs. negative mood induction) and the

within-participants dependent variable was the reaction time on two different target locations

(top vs. bottom) in a visual discrimination task.

Materials and procedure

In order to facilitate procedural commensurability, the stimulus field and the equipment were

largely identical to Experiment 1. Per contrast to Experiment 1 the target position was

randomized among two (instead of four) possible element positions from trial to trial (the target

appeared either at the top or the bottom of the computer screen). Furthermore, the target was

always present. In order to maximise the interspace between the target stimuli we reduced the

diameter of the outline circles to approximately 0.75° of diameter. The instructions were the

same as in Experiment 1.

The mood induction procedure and the subsequent validation of its effectiveness were identical

to Experiment 1.

Visual search task.

Directly after the mood manipulation check participants completed the visual discrimination

task. The target was presented either above or below the central fixation dot (in a randomized

fashion). The task of the participants was to discriminate whether the target appeared above or

below the central fixation dot. As in Experiment 1, the response keys were the “m” and “z”

keys. The order of these keys was counterbalanced so that half of the participants indicated

“above” with their right hand and the other half indicated “above” with their left hand.

Consequently, half of the participants indicated “below” with their right hand and the other half

indicated “below” with their left hand. The instructions, the arrangement of trial-blocks and the

feedback were similar to Experiment 1. Figure 3 illustrates the various display configurations

in a trial sequence.

Figure 3. An example of a trial sequence in the discrimination task. The fixation dot was

presented for 750ms, followed by the stimulus display. Percipients had to respond within 2

seconds.

Results of Experiment 2

Validation of experimental mood manipulations

As in Study 1, an independent-samples t-test was carried out to compare self-reported mood

between mood induction conditions. The four VAMS items formed an internally consistent

scale (Cronbach’s α = .92), therefore we analysed the mean composite score of the four items.

The t-test was significant, t(18) = 4.65, p < .05, η2 = .55. Participants in the negative mood

induction condition (M = 29.85, SD = 18.56) on the average reported fewer positive feelings

than those in the positive mood-induction condition (M = 71.70, SD = 21.60). The eta square

index indicated that 55% of the variance of the dependent variable was accounted for by

whether a participant was assigned to the positive mood induction condition or the negative

mood induction condition.

Statistical reaction time analysis

As in Study 1, inaccurate trials were dropped from the analysis. The total percentage of errors

in response to the target was 7.31%. Reaction times were then log-transformed. Trials that were

2.5 standard deviations below or above the grand mean were excluded from the analysis. A 2

(mood induction condition: positive vs. negative) x 2 (target position: top vs. bottom) repeated

measures ANOVA was performed on the transformed reaction times. The between subjects’

factor was the mood induction condition and the within subject factor was the target position.

There were no significant main effects: F(1,18) < 1, for the mood induction condition and F(1,

18) = 2.80, p > .05, η2 =.14, for the target position. Contrary to our prediction, the mood

induction x target position was also nonsignificant, F < 1. The results are visualized in Figure

Statistical error rate analysis

The total number of errors in response to the target was 7.31%. The errors were computed for

each condition for each participant. A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on these

totals with target location (top vs. bottom) as the within subject factor and mood induction

condition as the between subject factor. The factor target location was not significant, F(1, 18)

= 2.07, p > .05. There was no significant main effect of mood induction condition, F < 1, and

the interaction between target location and mood induction condition was also nonsignificant,

F(1, 18) = 1.12, p > .05. The results mirrored hose found in the analysis of the reaction time

data.

Figure 4. Mean reaction times for the visual discrimination task as function of mood induction

condition.

Discussion of Experiment 2

The results of the analysis of the mood induction procedure replicated those of Experiment 1

and indicated that the mood induction was successful. Furthermore, the analysis of variance did

not corroborate our hypothesis that positive mood facilitates target detection in the superior

visual field compared to target detection in the inferior visual field. In addition, when

participants were in a negative mood we observed no facilitation of target detection in the

inferior visual field, relative to target detection in the superior visual field.

Conclusions, statistical considerations & general discussion

Prior studies indicated that the encoding of affective stimuli is biased in a metaphorically

consistent manner (i.c., negative words are evaluated faster if they are presented in a low versus

high vertical position; but see Meier & Robinson, 2004). It has also been reported that

individual differences (e.g., depression and neuroticism) correlate with those perceptual biases

(Meier and Robinson, 2006). The last-mentioned study also showed that trait and state sources

of affect are open to a metaphor-based analysis. Specifically, the researchers argued that

neuroticism is more trait-like in nature than depression (which is more state-like). They inferred

from their analysis that depressive symptoms were a stronger predictor of metaphor consistent

vertical selective attention than neuroticism. However, their research (op. cit.) was correlational

and quasi-experimental in nature and therefore their experimental design has several

methodological drawbacks. In our study we examined this idea in a systematically controlled

fashion by testing whether such biases can be predicted a priori by experimentally induced

affective states. Contrary to our predictions, we did not find any effects of experimentally

induced affective states on perceptual biases. Surely there are obvious differences between

depressive symptoms and the negative mood we induced experimentally (i.e., the studies are

not fully commensurable). In addition, it is conceivable that participants unconsciously

attributed their negative mood to the mood induction and that this attribution undid the

hypothesised perceptual bias (although this explanation is unlikely – but it cannot be completely

ruled out prima facie as source-attribution can have multifarious unconscious effects). In

addition, our study was designed with the objective to investigate the idea that a systematic

assessment of vertical selective attention may function as an implicit measure

of individual

differences in positive and negative affect, as noted by Meier and Robinson (2006).

Specifically, the interesting question is if neuroticism and depressive symptoms could be

predicted by a straightforward psychophysical visual attention task. In praxis, this idea could

have interesting implications for the psychometric assessment of psychopathology, personality,

and emotion research in general. For instance, it has been proposed that “feeling down means

seeing down” (Meier & Robinson, 2006, p. 460). In our research, we took this idea one step

further and investigated experimentally whether vertical metaphors might also provide an

understanding of perceptual differences caused by the experience of positive and negative

mood. However, our predictions were not supported by the empirical data and one can only

speculate about the underlying reasons. The question of how negative results should be

interpreted is a long-standing methodological and statistical issue which has far-reaching

ramifications. Roland Fisher argued that null results do not allow for any form of logical

inference, but he was quite controversial in his own writings (for an excellent discussion of

Fishers quasi-Bayesian thinking see Gigerenzer, 1993). Moreover, the widespread phenomenon

of “publication bias” (which lies at the heart of the “replication crisis”) seriously compromises

the reliability of published scientific results. In the past, it was virtually impossible to publish

An Implicit Association Test (IAT) might shed new light on this question. A possible study could test implicit

association between verticality and affect.

negative results, despite the fact that negative results are as informative as positive findings

(they are just not sensational). This is now slowly changing (specifically du to internet data

services). “The Journal in support of the null hypothesis” is a laudable exception. However, a

single low-impact factor journal cannot counterbalance the publication bias which is associated

with the strong emphasis on significant results. Lowering the p-value threshold (as has been

suggested by a large group of influential researchers is therefore also no solution to the “cult of

significance testing”. Instead, we need to reconsider the logical fundamentals of the scientific

method and how they are implemented in the sociology of science. We would add another

Einstein quote to this discussion:

“No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me

wrong.”

We do not necessarily agree with this statement as the problem of the tertium quid

can never

be conclusively ruled out. This is a general problem in the philosophy of science which makes

conclusive deductive inference virtually impossible (cf. the Quine-Duhem thesis of

underdetermination of theory by data). It is an epistemological argument which highlights the

impossibility to control all factors in an experiment – simply due to the fact that the

experimenter might be utterly nescient

of them. The tertium-squid argument is associated

with the scientific virtue of epistemological humility. The awareness of an experimenter that

knowledge about potential confounds is always limited automatically reduces the level of

certainty in the veridicality of the specific conclusion. This in turn facilitates open-mindedness

and cognitive flexibility as numerous possibilities are now entertained simultaneously.

Furthermore, we are convinced that experimental results should always be published, regardless

of their level of statistical significance (specifically from a meta-analytic point of view). The

“pre-registration revolution” is a step in the right direction.

Classical NHST has numerous logical shortcomings and researchers in many fields are

beginning to adopt a Bayesian epistemological approach (this is generally not part of the

undergraduate psychology curriculum and the paralogic of p-values is unfortunately still widely

taught as the gold-standard for psychological analysis). From A Bayesian vantage point, it is

crucial that negative results are published in order to be able to define prior probabilities (i.e.,

The term tertium squid is an etymological derivative of the Greek triton, τρίτον τί, i.e., an unidentified third

element / an unknown confounding factor.

In the semantic context at hand, nescience (etymologically derived from the Latin prefix ne "not" + scire "to

know" cf. science) means “lacking knowledge” which is a more appropriate term than ignorance (which

describes an act of knowingly ignoring).

informed priors). Otherwise prior “beliefs” are biased by publication practices which confound

an accurate estimate of the real probabilistic status quo.

However, even for non-Bayesian reasoning approaches it is obvious that negative results are of

crucial value. The following parable concerning editorial policies illustrates the point beyond

any doubt:

There's this desert prison, see, with an old prisoner, resigned to his life, and a young

one just arrived. The young one talks constantly of escape, and, after a few months, he

makes a break. He's gone a week, and then he's brought back by the guards. He's half

dead, crazy with hunger and thirst. He describes how awful it was to the old prisoner.

The endless stretches of sand, no oasis, no signs of life anywhere. The old prisoner

listens for a while, then says, Yep, I know. I tried to escape myself twenty years ago. The

young prisoner says, You did? Why didn't you tell me, all these months I was planning

my escape? Why didn't you let me know it was impossible? And the old prisoner shrugs,

and says, So who publishes negative results? (Hudson, 1968, p. 168)

Currently the majority of authors, editors, reviewers and readers are not interested in seeing

null results in print. Based on the Popperian logic of falsification, null results are important

contributions to the corpus of scientific knowledge. The currently prevailing publication bias

(aka. “the file drawer effect” because negative results end up in the file-drawer) is a serious

problem for the generalisability and real-world validity of conclusions. Moreover, the

proportion of replication studies is minute, that is, almost no published finding is ever replicated

as replication is not reinforced. All other statistical considerations (Bayesian vs. frequentists,

exact α, correction for multiple comparison, replicability, etc. pp.) are secondary. As long as

this fundamental issue is not solved, science cannot call itself rational. Thus far, we have not

encountered a single valid argument which justifies the exclusive focus on positive

(confirmatory) results.

However, besides unbiased publishing the correct adjustment of α-levels is a logical

prerequisite for valid inferences and conclusions (that is, in the NHST framework). We argue

that if stringent (appropriate) α-control techniques would be applied, many experiments would

not reach statistical significance at the conventional α level (and hence would not get

published). This also applies to the “institution-wide error rate”,

that is the total number of

hypotheses which are tested within a given institution over a given period of time. In other

words, if researchers within a given institution would apply more conservative criteria, the

ranking of the institution would suffer (the ranking is based on research metrics like the total

number of publications). It can be seen, that many extraneous illogical factors prevent research

from applying proper statistical error correction methods, independent of their logical validity.

We term these factors “extralogical factors” in order to emphasise their independence from

purely rational scientific considerations. We argue that extralogical factor seriously impede

scientific progress and that they compromise scientific integrity. Furthermore, we argue that

interpersonal personality predispositions play an important role in this scenario. Intrinsically

motivated researchers focus less on external reinforcement and are more focused on knowledge

and accuracy as an inherent intrinsic reward (Sorrentino, Yamaguchi, Kuhl, & Keller, 2008).

By contrast, extrinsically motivated researchers are primarily motivated by external rewards. It

follows, that under the prevailing reinforcement schedule, intrinsically motivated researchers

are in a disadvantaged position, even though their virtuous attitudes are most conducive to

scientific progress (Kanfer, 2009; Maslow, 1970). Unfortunately, economic interests dominate

academia, a phenomenon Noam Chomsky termed “the corporatization of the university”

(Chomsky, 2011) and the ideals of Humboldtian science and education (Hanns Reill, 1994)

(e.g., corporate autonomy of universities, holistic academic education) are currently largely

supplanted by the military-industrial-entertainment complex (see Chomsky, 2011) and the

associated Taylorism (Littler, 1978).

In his analysis “how America's great university system is being destroyed”, Chomsky points

out that faculty are increasingly hired on the “Walmart model” (Punch & Chomsky, 2014). This

has obviously implications for the conduct of researchers. If publication metrics are a crucial

factor which determines job-security and promotion, then the prevailing incentive

contingencies reinforce a focus on self-serving motives which might be incompatible with

scientific virtuous which require an altruistic orientation (Edwards & Roy, 2017). The

behavioural effects of the prevailing reinforcement contingencies can be largely accounted for

in a simple behaviouristic S-R model.

The “institution-wide error rate” is a term invented by the author to refer to the total number of hypotheses

tested in a given academic institution. The more hypotheses are tsted, the higher the probability that the

institution will publish large numbers of papers which are based on statistically significant results (a key factor

for the ranking of the institution and hence for funding). Ergo, institutions might encourage large numbers of

studies with multiple hypotheses tests per study in order to gain a competitive advantage in the competition for

limited resources (a quasi-Darwinian strategy).

A statistical key argument is that the unbiased publishing of results is crucial for the validity

and generalisability of meta-analyses. In the age of big-data and AI results can be automatically

compiled and analysed by machine-learning algorithms. Machine learning algorithms can only

be trained if the training dataset is representative of the underlying real-word distribution.

Selected reporting of results is antagonistic to this endeavour. In other words, a classifier can

only reach an acceptable level of discrimination iff (if and only if) positive and negative results

are provided. Otherwise the Bayesian networks cannot adjust its weights in an appropriate

manner (this is independent on the type of algorithm). However, the same argument applies to

human cognition. It is therefore a malpractice to publish positive results selectively.

Sensationalism has no place in science – unfortunately publishers and social-networks “train”

scientist to aim for positive results to gain attention and hence reputation and career-advantages.

This egocentric modus operandi is clearly at odd with a genuine scientific attitude which is

based on integrity and the search for truth (independent of personal consequences, for an

excellent discussion see Edwards & Roy, 2017). In other words, the current publication

landscape has compromised scientific virtues and questionable socio-political aspects have

infiltrated the domain of science (cf. the Humboldtian ideals of independent science which

stress that science should be detached from economic factors).

The old standards of academic publishing no longer apply, and editorial policies should be

updated accordingly. It is a general phenomenon that social institutions (academia being one of

them) always lack behind technological progress. Technology changes faster than attitudes and

behaviour patterns. This also holds true in the domain of (automated) statistical inference.

Further, whole datasets

should always be published (unless there are ethical or related

concerns) in order to allow for “analytic reviews” (Sakaluk, Williams, & Biernat, 2014) and

reanalysis of the results in different statistical frameworks and/or under different model

parametrisations (e.g., various Bayesian prior probabilities, different distributional

assumptions, etc.).Furthermore, this would allow other researchers to test hypotheses which

were not on the radar of the researchers who conducted the experiments. This would obviously

increase research output and enhance the efficiency of science in general as datasets could be

“recycled” for multiple hypothesis testing procedures (of course this would render the statistical

topic associated with multiple-comparisons even more salient).

To conclude, regardless of the underlying explanation for the results at hand a pessimistic

comment should be made. Nowadays electronic media and communication devices (e.g.,

computers, TV, cell phones) become increasingly popular and there should be a general concern

with regard to the perceptual systems (especially of young children). The “embodied cognition”

concern is that such a “mechanized culture” limits the use of the body. In the United Kingdom

young children (on average) have access to five different screens at home (Sigman, 2012). They

have access to the primary family television (which is usually positioned in the very centre of

the living room) and many very young children possess their own bedroom TV (in addition to

portable devices, e.g., mobile phone, tablet, laptop, etc.). Independent of the questionable mass-

media content which is consumed on these devices the daily amount of screen-time increased

dramatically over the last decades. It is extremely likely that this effects thedevelopment of the

perceptual system (e.g., the ratio between senses) – especially from a psychophysics point of

We are convinced that transparency should be one of the hallmarks of proper scientific research and nowadays

there is no excuse why one should not make all material/data publicly available. Nowadays researchers can

easily include a URL in all their publications or use the Open Science Framework (Foster, MSLS & Deardorff,

MLIS, 2017), or similar repositories in order to foster “open knowledge” and “open data” (Boulton et al., 2012;

Molloy, 2011). This would facilitate replication and, consequently, enhance the reliability of scientific findings.

In addition, it has been cogently argued that “open science is a research accelerator” (Woelfle, Olliaro, & Todd,

2011). The “replication crisis” is currently of great concern (Aarts et al., 2015; Baker, 2016; Munafò et al., 2017;

Peng, 2015). A conscience discussion of this multifaceted “metascientific” topic is provided in a recent N

ATURE

article (Schooler, 2014). Furthermore, this approach would enable other researchers to evaluate the validity of

the reported findings by reanalysing the data (third party verification). Unbiased independent researchers who do

not have any “unconscious” theory-driven vested interests (i.e., no confirmation bias) might discover patterns in

the data which escaped the author’s attention and they might be able to test novel hypotheses which were not part

of the initial research agenda. Science should be a collective endeavour and ego-involvement should be

minimized while knowledge accumulation should be the primary motif. Collectively, society would benefit from

a more transparent approach towards science, especially in the long run. Moreover, openly publishing data could

facilitate (possibly AI/machine learning driven) meta-analytic research (e.g., large-scale data mining). Such

(semi-)automated procedures have the potential to significantly speed up general scientific progress.

Furthermore, publishing negative results could potentially alleviate the long-standing and hitherto unresolved

problem of α-error inflation.

view (e.g., constant gaze fixation). We argue that the cognitive development, imagination, and

creativity of young children may be severely hampered by the lifeless contact that occurs in

human-computer interactions (Chirico, 1998). What will embodied minds become like in a

digitized culture where screen-time becomes a simulacrum (cf. studies on hyperreality) for real

interaction with the physical world? Moreover, how does this affect the development of

perception (and consequently cognition in general)? In his influential book “Understanding

Media: The Extensions of Man” published in 1964 Marshall McLuhan coined the phrase “The

medium is the message”

by which meant that the sensori characteristics of a given medium

(the channel through which a information is propagated) are much more important than the

semantic meaning or content of the information being transmitted. We warn that the current

situation should be regarded as an unregulated large-scale experiment on the perceptual and

cognitive systems of the next generation of human beings (initiated by the technology industry

and without any control group, without ethical permission, and without explicit consent). We

are very concerned that the side-effect of this type of habitual screen fixation will be very

detrimental to cognitive development in many domains (let alone the domain of social and

affective neuroscience). From an embodied cognition perspective brains are not formed

independent of the type of input. In line with McLuhan’s argument, the brain is shaped by the

sensorial characteristics of the incoming data. In this context, Plato’s timeless “allegory of the

cave” can be reinterpreted in as a “digital cage” (likewise Putnam’s analogue “the brain in a vat

argument” becomes “the brain before a screen argument”). Embodied cognition researchers

understand the effects of sensorimotor development on higher order cognition better that most

other scientists and they are therefore responsible to take action in order to counteract the

bombardment of children by the mass-media and technology industry which tries to depict these

developments as desiderata (mobile devices are euphemistically labelled as *smart*phones,

McLuhan stated the following:

“The family circle has widened. The worldpool of information fathered by electric media—movies, Telstar,

flight–far surpasses any possible influence mom and dad can now bring to bear. Character no longer is shaped

by only two earnest, fumbling experts.” (p.14)

Relevant sections of the book can be accessed under the following URL:

https://archive.org/details/UnderstandingMediaTheExtensionsOfManMarshallMcLuhan_201810/page/n11

etc.).

From an embodied cognition point of view, responsible usage of screen-devices is

crucial for proper cognitive development, especially given the importance of varied (natural)

sensorimotor stimulation the critical formative years brain development in which

neuroplasticity is at its peak. This should also be evaluated in an evolutionary context. From a

phylogenetic perspective (during the course of evolution), our brain were never exposed to this

form of technological stimulation. Our perceptual systems evolved to respond to biological

stimuli (not to icons on a screen). It seems therefore irresponsible to abruptly shift the

environmental demands on the perceptual system in such a dramatic way. The essential

principle of sensory homeostasis is of significant in this respect. Our brains are evolutionary

accustomed to specific natural input-patterns. If this balance of sensory data is disrupted

(without giving the system any time to adapt in a gradual manner) then the consequences can

be extremely detrimental for the evolution of the cognitive system as a whole. Given that the

cognitive systems are embedded in macro-scale social systems these problems will translate

into socio-economic and socio-political problems (viz., a holistic/cybernetic complex systems

view on the effects of altering the demands placed on perceptual systems). For reasons of

parsimony we will end the discussion which just a single example: Imagine what it means for

a society if human beings have significantly shortened attention spans (reduced capacity of

prefrontal executive functions) due to the constant exposure to technological devices which

“entrain” a specific cognitive modus operandi which interferes with sustained attention and

cognitive top-down control in general.

The implications are obviously extremely far-reaching

and social processes in many domains will be affected by this cognitive change alone. However,

there are numerous cognitive changes which accompany the constant use of screen-devices and

these changes will synergise in an unpredictable (non-linear) manner. As stated before, the

current situation is an uncontrolled large-scale experiment on the sensorium of the human

populace which is primarily driven by the technology industry (concentrated in Silicon Valley).

Do these technological actors have the patience and foresight to take the necessary caution?

Another factor of concerns in the context of cognitive development is the exposure to electromagnetic

radiation by mobile devices. Studies indicate that associated electro-magnetic radiation has negative effects of

various organ systems, that it interferes with neuronal processes, and that it increases the permeability of the

blood-brain barrier which protects the sensitive developing brain from toxic exogenous substances (Nittby et al.,

2009). Manufacturers of mobile devices warn in the fine print that devices should not be in direct contact with

the body. However, it has been argued that this should not be hidden in the fine-print (presumably as a juridical

strategy) but that customers should be explicitly warned about the potential harm of mobile devices, but see

http://www.showthefineprint.org

From a Kurzweilian perspective there might be other posthumanist motives why children should be habituated

to information technology.

And will they incorporate fundamental principles of developmental psychology in their

decision-making procedures? Or are they mainly driven by the predominant Zeitgeist of

extrinsic capitalistic profit-motives and by the quasi-Darwinian principles of competition for

market resources (cf. “realistic conflict theory” in social psychology)? We leave this important

question open and ask the reader to reflect on this problem which concerns the future of the

cognitive development of humanity as a whole. We will close with an echo of the peripatetic

axiom in the context of 21

century information technology: Nihil est in intellectu quod non sit

prius in sensu.

Appendix

The positive mood was induced by a scene from the Walt Disney cartoon film “Jungle Book”

showing Mowgli dancing with Baloo the bear to the song “Bare Necessities of Life.” The

negative mood was induced by a scene from “Sophie’s Choice,” in which a mother is compelled

to select one of her children to be sent to a Nazi concentration camp. Meta-analytic research

indicates that these are powerful methods to manipulate emotions.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the European Union Marie Curie Initial Training Network

Marie Curie Actions: FP7-PEOPLE-2013-ITN-604764

URL: http://cognovo.eu

We thank Dr. Karen Mortier (Free University of Amsterdam) for her support and constructive

feedback.

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Footnotes

An implicit association test (IAT) measures differential association of 2 target concepts

with an attribute (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). The two concepts appear in a two-

choice task (i.c., moral vs. immoral), and the attribute in a second task (i.c., up vs. down).

When instructions oblige highly associated categories (i.c., moral + high) to share a response

key, performance is faster than when less associated categories (i.c., moral + down) share a

key. This performance difference implicitly measures differential association of the two

concepts with the attribute.

Daniel Tammet has extraordinary mental abilities and is one of the world’s few savants.

He can do calculations to 100 decimal places in his head. A documentary about him (named

The boy with the incredible brain) can be seen on the following website:

http://video.google.com/videosearch?q=the+boy+with+the+incredible+brain#