Gradual process theory: The role of self-control in syllogistic reasoning
Master Thesis by Christopher B. Germann (PhD, Msc, BSc / Marie Curie Fellow)
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Thesis Abstract.
In the psychological literature logical reasoning is prevalently associated with Type 2 processes (characterized as slow, controlled, limited in capacity, and effortful) whereas belief based judgments are frequently linked to Type 1 processes (described as fast, automatic, high in capacity, and effortless). In two experiments we investigated the effects of ego depletion on simple hypothetical syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 1) and complex categorical syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 2). We manipulated self regulatory resources between groups and participants were subsequently instructed to evaluate conclusions of syllogisms either on the basis of their semantic believability or logical validity. We hypothesized that belief based judgments would be faster and more accurate relative to logic judgments and that ego-depletion would interfere with the latter but not with the former. This hypothesis was motivated by the strength model of self-control (Baumeister et al., 2007) and the default-interventionist account of reasoning (Evans, 2007). The results are discussed in the theoretical framework of dual process theories of reasoning.
The R code associated with various analyses used in this thesis can be found under the following URL I created: http://r-code.ml
Dual system theory: Summary of the features attributed to each system
System 1
System 2
Evolutionary (philogenetically) old
Unconscious, preconscious
Shared with animals
Implicit knowledge
Automatic
Fast
Parallel
High capacity
Intuitive
Contextualized
Pragmatic
Associative
Independent of general intelligence
Subersonal reasoning
Evolutionary (philogenetically) recent
Conscious
Uniquely (distinctively) human
Explicit knowledge
Controlled
Slow
Sequential
Low capacity
Reflective
Abstract
Logical
Rule-based
Linked to general intelligence
Personal reasoning
Partially adapted from Frankish, K. (2009). Systems and levels: Dual-system theory and the personal-subpersonal distinction. In J. S. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (p. 89-108). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dual-process models: A multifarious nomenclature
automatic vs. controlled (Kahneman, 2003)
associative vs. rule based (Sloman, 1996)
heuristic vs. analytic (Klaczynski, 2001)
personal vs. subpersonal (Frankish, 2009)
analogue vs. symbolic (Paivio, 1986)
reflexive vs. reflective (Lieberman et al., 2002)
heuristic vs. systematic (Chaiken, 1980)
peripheral vs. central (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981)
implicit vs. explicit (Greenwald et al., 1998)
automatic vs. conscious (Baumeister, 2005)
experiential vs. noetic (Strack & Deutsch, 2004)
intuitive vs. reflective (Sperber, 1997)
associative vs. propositional (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006)
etc. pp.
It has been noted that “what matters is not the specific names but the fact of duality” (Baumeister, 2005, p.75).
Nobel lecture by Prof. Daniel Kahneman on “dual-process theory and bounded rationality”
“The central executive component of working memory is a poorly specified and very powerful system that could be criticized as little more than a homunculus. a research strategy is outlined that attempts to specify and analyse its component functions and is illustrated with four lines of research. the first concerns the study of the capacity to coordinate performance on two separate tasks. a second involves the capacity to switch retrieval strategies as reflected in random generation. the capacity to attend selectively to one stimulus and inhibit the disrupting effect of others comprises the third line of research, and the fourth involves the capacity to hold and manipulate information in long-term memory, as reflected in measures of working memory span. it is suggested that this multifaceted approach is a fruitful one that leaves open the question of whether it will ultimately prove more appropriate to regard the executive as a unified system with multiple functions, or simply as an agglomeration of independent though interacting control processes. in the meantime, it seems useful to continue to use the concept of a central executive as a reminder of the crucially important control functions of working memory. [abstract from author]”
Baddeley, A.. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11), 417–423.
“In 1974, baddeley and hitch proposed a three-component model of working memory. over the years, this has been successful in giving an integrated account not only of data from normal adults, but also neuropsychological, developmental and neuroimaging data. there are, however, a number of phenomena that are not readily captured by the original model. these are outlined here and a fourth component to the model, the episodic buffer, is proposed. it comprises a limited capacity system that provides temporary storage of information held in a multimodal code, which is capable of binding information from the subsidiary systems, and from long-term memory, into a unitary episodic representation. conscious awareness is assumed to be the principal mode of retrieval from the buffer. the revised model differs from the old principally in focussing attention on the processes of integrating information, rather than on the isolation of the subsystems. in doing so, it provides a better basis for tackling the more complex aspects of executive control in working memory. copyright (c) 2000 elsevier science ltd.”
Baddeley, A.. (1992). Working memory. Science, 255(5044), 556–559.
“The term working memory refers to a brain system that provides temporary storage and manipulation of the information necessary for such complex cognitive tasks as language comprehension, learning, and reasoning. this definition has evolved from the concept of a unitary short-term memory system. working memory has been found to require the simultaneous storage and processing of information. it can be divided into the following three subcomponents: (i) the central executive, which is assumed to be an attentional-controlling system, is important in skills such as chess playing and is particularly susceptible to the effects of alzheimer’s disease; and two slave systems, namely (ii) the visuospatial sketch pad, which manipulates visual images and (iii) the phonological loop, which stores and rehearses speech-based information and is necessary for the acquisition of both native and second-language vocabulary.”
Baddeley, A.. (2003). Working memory: looking back and looking forward. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(10), 829–839.
“The concept of working memory proposes that a dedicated system maintains and stores information in the short term, and that this system underlies human thought processes. current views of working memory involve a central executive and two storage systems: the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad. although this basic model was first proposed 30 years ago, it has continued to develop and to stimulate research and debate. the model and the most recent results are reviewed in this article.”
Ball, L. J., Phillips, P., Wade, C. N., & Quayle, J. D.. (2006). Effects of Belief and Logic on Syllogistic Reasoning. Experimental Psychology, 53(1), 77–86.
“Studies of syllogistic reasoning have demonstrated a nonlogical tendency for people to endorse more believable conclusions than unbelievable ones. this belief bias effect is more dominant on invalid syllogisms than valid ones, giving rise to a logic by belief interaction. we report an experiment in which participants’ eye movements were recorded in order to provide insights into the nature and time course of the reasoning processes associated with manipulations of conclusion validity and believability. our main dependent measure was people’s inspection times for syllogistic premises, and we tested predictions deriving from three contemporary mental-models accounts of the logic by belief interaction. results supported recent ‘selective processing’ theories of belief bias (e.g., evans, 2000; klauer, musch, & naumer, 2000), which assume that the believability of a conclusion biases model construction processes, rather than biasing the search for falsifying models (e.g., oakhill & johnson-laird, 1985) or a response stage of reasoning arising from subjective uncertainty (e.g., quayle & ball, 2000). we conclude by suggesting that the eye-movement analyses in reasoning research may provide a useful adjunct to other process-tracing techniques such as verbal protocol analysis.”
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M.. (2007). The Strength Model of Self-Control. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16(6), 351–355.
“Self-control is a central function of the self and an important key to success in life. the exertion of self-control appears to depend on a limited resource. just as a muscle gets tired from exertion, acts of self-control cause short-termimpairments (ego depletion) in subsequent self-control, even on unrelated tasks. research has supported the strength model in the domains of eating, drinking, spending, sexuality, intelligent thought, making choices, and interpersonal behavior. motivational or framing factors can temporarily block the deleterious effects of being in a state of ego depletion. blood glucose is an important component of the energy.”
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S.. (2004). Conflict monitoring and anterior cingulate cortex: an update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(12), 539–546.
“One hypothesis concerning the human dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (acc) is that it functions, in part, to signal the occurrence of conflicts in information processing, thereby triggering compensatory adjustments in cognitive control. since this idea was first proposed, a great deal of relevant empirical evidence has accrued. this evidence has largely corroborated the conflict-monitoring hypothesis, and some very recent work has provided striking new support for the theory. at the same time, other findings have posed specific challenges, especially concerning the way the theory addresses the processing of errors. recent research has also begun to shed light on the larger function of the acc, suggesting some new possibilities concerning how conflict monitoring might fit into the cingulate’s overall role in cognition and action.”
Bush, G., Luu, P., & Posner, M. I.. (2000). Cognitive and emotional influences in anterior cingulate cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(6), 215–222.
“Anterior cingulate cortex (acc) is a part of the brain’s limbic system. classically, this region has been related to affect, on the basis of lesion studies in humans and in animals. in the late 1980s, neuroimaging research indicated that acc was active in many studies of cognition. the findings from eeg studies of a focal area of negativity in scalp electrodes following an error response led to the idea that acc might be the brain’s error detection and correction device. in this article, these various findings are reviewed in relation to the idea that acc is a part of a circuit involved in a form of attention that serves to regulate both cognitive and emotional processing. neuroimaging studies showing that separate areas of acc are involved in cognition and emotion are discussed and related to results showing that the error negativity is influenced by affect and motivation. in addition, the development of the emotional and cognitive roles of acc are discussed, and how the success of this regulation in controlling responses might be correlated with cingulate size. finally, some theories are considered about how the different subdivisions of acc might interact with other cortical structures as a part of the circuits involved in the regulation of mental and emotional activity.”
Evans, J. S. B. T., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P.. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11(3), 295–306.
“Three experiments are reported that investigate the weighting attached to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. substantial belief biases were observed despite controls for possible conversions of the premises. equally substantial effects of logic were observed despite controls for two possible response biases. a consistent interaction between belief and logic was also recorded; belief bias was more marked on invalid than on valid syllogisms. in all experiments, verbal protocols were recorded and analyzed. these protocols are interpreted in some cases as providing rationalizations for prejudiced decisions and, in other cases, as reflecting a genuine process of premise to conclusion reasoning. in the latter cases, belief bias was min- imal but still present. similarly, even subjects who focus primarily on the conclusion are influ- enced to an extent by the logic. thus a conflict between logic and belief is observed through- out, but at several levels of extent. an”
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical Thinking: Dual Processes in Reasoning and Judgement. Routledge
“Hypothetical thought involves the imagination of possibilities and the exploration of their consequences by a process of mental simulation. using a recently developed theoretical framework called hypothetical thinking theory, jonathan st. b. t. evans provides an integrated theoretical account of a wide range of psychological studies on hypothesis testing, reasoning, judgement and decision making. hypothetical thinking theory is built on three key principles, implemented in a revised and updated version of evans’ well-known heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning. the central claim of this book is that this theory can provide an integrated account of some apparently very diverse phenomena including confirmation bias in hypothesis testing, acceptance of fallacies in deductive reasoning, belief biases in reasoning and judgement, biases of statistical judgement and a number of characteristic findings in the study of decision making. the author also provides broad ranging discussion of cognitive biases, human rationality and dual-process theories of higher cognition. hypothetical thinking draws on and develops arguments first proposed in evans’ earlier work from this series, bias in human reasoning. in the new theory, however, cognitive biases are attributed equally to analytic and heuristic processing and a much wider range of phenomena are reviewed and discussed. it will therefore be of great interest to researchers and post-graduates in psychology and the cognitive sciences, as well as to undergraduate students looking for a comprehensive review of current work on reasoning and decision-making.”
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Pollard, P.. (1990). Belief Bias and Problem Complexity in Deductive Reasoning. In Advances in Psychology (pp. 131–154)
“Hypothetical thought involves the imagination of possibilities and the exploration of their consequences by a process of mental simulation. using a recently developed theoretical framework called hypothetical thinking theory, jonathan st. b. t. evans provides an integrated theoretical account of a wide range of psychological studies on hypothesis testing, reasoning, judgement and decision making. hypothetical thinking theory is built on three key principles, implemented in a revised and updated version of evans’ well-known heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning. the central claim of this book is that this theory can provide an integrated account of some apparently very diverse phenomena including confirmation bias in hypothesis testing, acceptance of fallacies in deductive reasoning, belief biases in reasoning and judgement, biases of statistical judgement and a number of characteristic findings in the study of decision making. the author also provides broad ranging discussion of cognitive biases, human rationality and dual-process theories of higher cognition. hypothetical thinking draws on and develops arguments first proposed in evans’ earlier work from this series, bias in human reasoning. in the new theory, however, cognitive biases are attributed equally to analytic and heuristic processing and a much wider range of phenomena are reviewed and discussed. it will therefore be of great interest to researchers and post-graduates in psychology and the cognitive sciences, as well as to undergraduate students looking for a comprehensive review of current work on reasoning and decision-making.”
Kennerley, S. W., Walton, M. E., Behrens, T. E. J., Buckley, M. J., & Rushworth, M. F. S.. (2006). Optimal decision making and the anterior cingulate cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 9(7), 940–947.
“Learning the value of options in an uncertain environment is central to optimal decision making. the anterior cingulate cortex (acc) has been implicated in using reinforcement information to control behavior. here we demonstrate that the acc’s critical role in reinforcement-guided behavior is neither in detecting nor in correcting errors, but in guiding voluntary choices based on the history of actions and outcomes. acc lesions did not impair the performance of monkeys (macaca mulatta) immediately after errors, but made them unable to sustain rewarded responses in a reinforcement-guided choice task and to integrate risk and payoff in a dynamic foraging task. these data suggest that the acc is essential for learning the value of actions.”
Miller, E. K., & Cohen, J. D.. (2001). An Integrative Theory of Prefrontal Cortex Function. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 24(1), 167–202.
“The prefrontal cortex has long been suspected to play an important role in cognitive control, in the ability to orchestrate thought and action in accordance with internal goals. its neural basis, however, has remained a mystery. here, we propose that cognitive control stems from the active maintenance of patterns of activity in the prefrontal cortex that represent goals and the means to achieve them. they provide bias signals to other brain structures whose net effect is to guide the flow of activity along neural pathways that establish the proper mappings between inputs, internal states, and outputs needed to perform a given task. we review neurophysiological, neurobiological, neuroimaging, and computational studies that support this theory and discuss its implications as well as further issues to be addressed”
Morley (née Lambell), N. J., Evans, J. S. B. T., & Handley, S. J.. (2004). Belief Bias and Figural Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 57(4), 666–692.
“Belief bias is the tendency to be influenced by the believability of the conclusion when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. figural bias is the tendency to be influenced by the order in which the information is presented in the premises when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. when studied simultaneously they enable an investigation of whether participants’ reasoning on the syllogistic reasoning task is guided by the conclusion (backward reasoning) or the premises (forward reasoning). experiments 1 and 2 found evidence of belief bias but not figural bias on the syllogistic evaluation task paradigm. experiments 3 and 4 found evidence of figural bias but not belief bias on the syllogistic production task paradigm. the findings highlight that different task characteristics influence performance dependent upon the nature of task presentation. these findings are discussed in the context of current theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.”
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F.. (2000). Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?. Psychological Bulletin
“The authors review evidence that self-control may consume a limited resource. exerting self-control may consume self-control strength, reducing the amount of strength available for subsequent self-control efforts. coping with stress, regulating negative affect, and resisting temptations require self-control, and after such self-control efforts, subsequent attempts at self-control are more likely to fail. continuous self-control efforts, such as vigilance, also degrade over time. these decrements in self-control are probably not due to negative moods or learned helplessness produced by the initial self-control attempt. these decrements appear to be specific to behaviors that involve self-control; behaviors that do not require self-control neither consume nor require self-control strength. it is concluded that the executive component of the self–in particular, inhibition–relies on a limited, consumable resource.”
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F.. (2008). On the Relative Independence of Thinking Biases and Cognitive Ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
“In 7 different studies, the authors observed that a large number of thinking biases are uncorrelated with cognitive ability. these thinking biases include some of the most classic and well-studied biases in the heuristics and biases literature, including the conjunction effect, framing effects, anchoring effects, outcome bias, base-rate neglect, ‘less is more’ effects, affect biases, omission bias, myside bias, sunk-cost effect, and certainty effects that violate the axioms of expected utility theory. in a further experiment, the authors nonetheless showed that cognitive ability does correlate with the tendency to avoid some rational thinking biases, specifically the tendency to display denominator neglect, probability matching rather than maximizing, belief bias, and matching bias on the 4-card selection task. the authors present a framework for predicting when cognitive ability will and will not correlate with a rational thinking tendency. (psycinfo database record (c) 2016 apa, all rights reserved)”
Tsujii, T., & Watanabe, S.. (2009). Neural correlates of dual-task effect on belief-bias syllogistic reasoning: A near-infrared spectroscopy study. Brain Research, 1287, 118–125.
“The dual-process theory of reasoning explained the belief-bias effect, the tendency for human reasoning to be erroneously biased when logical conclusions are incongruent with belief about the world, by proposing a belief-based fast heuristic system and a logic-based slow analytic system. although the claims were supported by behavioral findings that the belief-bias effect was enhanced when subjects were not given sufficient time for reasoning, the neural correlates were still unknown. the present study therefore examined the relationship between the time-pressure effect and activity in the inferior frontal cortex (ifc) during belief-bias reasoning using near-infrared spectroscopy (nirs). forty-eight subjects performed congruent and incongruent reasoning tasks, involving long-span (20 s) and short-span trials (10 s). behavioral analysis found that only incongruent reasoning performance was impaired by the time-pressure of short-span trials. nirs analysis found that the time-pressure decreased right ifc activity during incongruent trials. correlation analysis showed that subjects with enhanced right ifc activity could perform better in incongruent trials, while subjects for whom the right ifc activity was impaired by the time-pressure could not maintain better reasoning performance. these findings suggest that the right ifc may be responsible for the time-pressure effect in conflicting reasoning processes. when the right ifc activity was impaired in the short-span trials in which subjects were not given sufficient time for reasoning, the subjects may rely on the fast heuristic system, which result in belief-bias responses. we therefore offer the first demonstration of neural correlates of time-pressure effect on the ifc activity in belief-bias reasoning.”
Wood, J. N., & Grafman, J.. (2003). Human prefrontal cortex: processing and representational perspectives. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(2), 139–147.
“Through evolution, humans have acquired ‘higher’ cognitive skills — such as language, reasoning and planning — and complex social behaviour. evidence from neuropsychological and neuroimaging research indicates that the prefrontal cortex {(pfc)} underlies much of this higher cognition. a number of theories have been proposed for how the {pfc} might achieve this. although many of these theories focus on the types of ‘process’ that the {pfc} carries out, we argue for the validity of a representational approach to understanding {pfc} function.”
Below you find a custom-made “meta-search-tool” (coded in ActionScript2) which facilitates to effectively search the web for psychology and neuroscience related information.
You can freely download the program as a zipped executable: https://christopher-germann.de/tools/meta_search_tool_v1.2.zip
